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ABSTRACT 
oday, almost 3.5 billion people worldwide use the Internet worldwide regularly [1]. 
Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI) [2] forecast that global internet traffic will 
nearly triple from 2015 to 2020 and will reach 2.3ZB because of Internet of Things (IoT). This 
proliferation of the Internet builds a profitable economy, makes life comfortable, more 
informative and most importantly it is more susceptible to network attacks. Security devices 
such as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) [3] are an effective tool to 
safeguard network devices such as routers, switches, servers and IoT devices from attacks but a 
carefully crafted Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack  and emerging IoT DDoS attacks 
can fool present methodologies and overwhelm a server; such attacks may be the next wave of 
cyber warfare and cyber-crime. In 2013, according to Arbor Networks [4], there were 2934 
DDoS attacks per day worldwide with a total peak attack of 253giga bits per second. With the 
revolution of IoT, existing IoT DDoS attacks have peaked at a staggering 1.1 Terra bits per 
second [5] for one target in 2016. Protecting web servers from DDoS attacks and particularly 
from IoT DDoS attacks in real time is a critical challenge for the security systems. 
    Though there are many effective methods to mitigate DDoS and IoT DDoS, all result in 
punishing both the attack traffic and the legitimate (and profitable) flash traffic. The main aim 
of this Ph.D. research is to detect DDoS and IoT DDoS attack traffic with minimal 
punishment of the profitable legitimate traffic. This research has developed a novel architecture 
and adaptive methods to provide a dynamic and effective detection mechanism. A real-time 
scoring algorithm has implemented on an Apache web server where shared memory was used 
to interact with a daemon. This combination will stop, degrade, or allow the DDoS detection 
rules based on their measured accuracy. This real-time adaptive approach better detects and 
blocks the attack traffic with less punishment of the profitable legitimate traffic. 
      Improving security against DDoS often has an unintended side effect; an increase in the 
carbon footprint. A study of improving security must thus go hand in hand with a study on how 
to reduce power consumption in security devices. We have discovered a significant problem in 
the IDPS approach [6, 7], the power requirements are increased for the repeated packet 
T 
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reception which is both costly and environmentally unfriendly. The thesis shows that by moving 
all IDPS functionality into either the webserver or firewall the power is saved by eliminating 
multiple receptions of the same packet. These results suggest the novel architecture intended to 
improve DDoS resilience also reduces the power consumption of a web server farm thus 
reducing the carbon footprint. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
he explosive growth of the Internet [8] has changed our perception of the “normal” way 
of doing things. For example, IoT devices can control and secure our homes. Websites 
such as online ticket booking, online share trading, and many online services make life easier and 
save money. Even many small and mid-size companies have managed to build quite profitable 
online businesses, which in turn benefit the country’s economy. In this Internet-based economy 
where web servers are most significant and it is desirable to safeguard the webservers from 
vulnerable attacks. One of the biggest problems for current web server farms is the DDoS and 
IoT based DDoS attacks. Blocking DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks is made even harder by a new 
form of user behaviour- the flash crowd. Existing methodologies find it very difficult to isolate 
and reject DDoS traffic when legitimate traffics or flash crowds (traffic generated by humans) 
are involved. This Chapter provides a brief introduction about the webserver DDoS and IoT 
DDoS attacks and emphasises the importance of this thesis work. 
1.1 DDoS, IoT DDoS and Flash crowds 
Attacks are classified based on the actions performed. Common actions [9] are probing target 
devices illegally, scanning sequence of devices to find a specific target to attack, flood the victim 
device by accessing repeatedly, use authentication to mimic a legitimate user, bypass the firewalls,  
pretending to be a real user, read, copy or steal the content of data unethically, modify the 
original data or delete the target completely. An attacker can perform one or more actions as 
explained above to achieve their goals. One of the major and most problematic attacks are 
Denial of Service attacks (DoS). 
DoS, as the name implies, aims to deny the service of network resources to legitimate users. It is 
a threat to network security all around the world. DDoS [10] is one method of DoS attack, in 
which thousands of   zombie   machines (infected personal computers machines) or Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices are used to attack the target machine, indefinitely interrupting or 
suspending services of a host connected to the Internet. A good example is recent reports that a 
DDoS gang takes down BBC websites, Donald Trump’s campaign site over holiday weekend 
[11]. A concerted DDoS can hold any online business to ransom. 
T 
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Notable reports on DDoS attacks from personal computers include:  
 On October 2016, massive DDoS attacks on DNS provider Dyn [12] [13] 
 On June 7, 2012 [14], DDoS attacks South Korea by North Korea. 
 On May 17, 2007 [15], massive DDoS attacks targeted on Estonia by sources inside 
Russia made the Internet service unavailable to the whole country resulting in financial 
losses.  
The AO Kaspersky Lab report [16] summarised the DDoS attacks that happened in 2017 and 
revealed that statistics of DDoS attacks on servers have seen a considerable increase [12]. 
The DDoS attacks further expands the threat to many organisation with the use of IoT 
technology called IoT DDoS attacks.  A latest cyber security review [17] stated that in Q3 2017, 
there is an average of 237 IoT DDoS attacks done per month.  IoT devices pose a serious threat 
to the web as poorly configured or faultily design devices can be used for massive IoT DDoS 
attacks. High jacked IoT devices that act like real users are a particular problem that present 
significant difficulties. IoT DDoS attacks as a special subclass of DDoS attacks that deserve 
special attention as this is a new form of attack that could provide massive volumes of attack 
traffic given the expected explosion in IoT numbers in the near future.  
 Notable reports on IoT DDoS attacks: 
 KerbsOnSecurity [5] in 2016 targeted with more than 145 thousand hacked IoT 
devices such as cameras and digital video recorders with a total botnet capacity of 
1.5Tbps. The Mirai botnet [18] was used in the attack. 
 Many organisation faced IoT DDoS attacks which was increased 91% in 2017 [17].  
Figure 1.1 map [19] shows the DDoS attack happens on every second all over the world. The 
severity of DDoS attacks has steadily increased with new emerging attack techniques making 
detection even harder. 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                              Introduction  
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Figure 1.1 DDoS attack map [19] 
 
There is a new Internet phenomenon called the “flash crowd” [20]. Flash traffic or a flash crowd 
is where a very large number of users simultaneously access a particular website and this 
produces a surge in traffic to the website that might overwhelm a site. For example, websites 
such as online ticket booking, online share trading or even news websites may have a massive 
surge in legitimate traffic when there are new breaking events. DDoS and flash crowd traffic 
possess the same characteristics of bursty traffic with huge volumes so it is very difficult to 
identify the attack traffic. Imagine, creating an online shopping website – which has become very 
popular and is making a good profit. The Russian Business Network (RBN) [21] has targeted 
your website with 10,000 zombie machines that mimic a normal user. How can this traffic be 
blocked without affecting legitimate users? 
1.2 Framework. 
DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks operate at either the network layer or the application layer of 
the OSI (Open System Interconnection) model. Detecting DDoS and IoT DDoS attack traffic is 
more complex particularly when the flash crowds are involved. Some good research works has 
been done on differentiating flash crowds from attack traffic. 
Most common DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks on network layer are based on spoofing IP 
addresses, SYN flooding, UDP flooding and ICMP flooding and there are many successful 
methods to mitigate those well-known types of attack. The IDPS handles IP spoofing and blocks 
any half-opened connection. There is important to note that only botnet attacks hide IP address 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                              Introduction  
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by spoofing a valid IP address, zombie attacks don’t hide IP addresses and don’t do half-open 
connection rather a Zombie will mimic like a normal user.  
Common detection techniques at the application layer are based on old, statistical analysis, web 
access behaviour and CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans Apart). The statistical analysis approach makes a wrong assumption that the old 
traffic data will have the same statistical database of new incoming flash traffic hence this 
approach will punish the profitable legitimate traffic. Other methods such as CAPTCHA, and 
puzzles will work but this is troublesome for human users thus punishing the benign user who 
may leave the site.  
There are many good techniques used at the network layer also at the application layer but the 
algorithms are weak in that they punish profitable legitimate traffic as well as attack traffic. 
Consider online shopping websites like Amazon or e-bay, this lost legitimate traffic represents a 
financial loss that is no longer acceptable.  
1.3 IDPS  
It is very significant that the security devices should not be overwhelmed with the bursty 
traffic and should be very capable of eliminating only the attack traffic without punishing the 
harmless and possibly profitable legitimate traffic. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) aims to 
detect and alert the system when suspicious traffic occurs. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) 
goes one-step further and blocks the offending traffic. IDPS [22] uses different methodologies to 
detect the attack, the most common detection methodologies are signature based detection, 
anomaly based detection, and stateful protocol analysis.  
 Signature based detection is best suitable for well-known attacks.  
 Anomaly based detection detects abnormal traffic but result in a high level of false 
predictions. 
 Stateful analysis blocks half-opened connections but DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks at the 
application layer after finishing the handshaking process. 
Both the anomaly and stateful based detection are resource-intensive because of the complexity 
of the analysis and the overhead involved in performing tracking for many simultaneous 
sessions. This, in turn, overloads the IDS function. There are many existing IDPS methods to 
detect DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks but all penalize both the legitimate and the attack traffic as 
well as using up electrical power. 
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Waleed et al [23] and other researchers suggested placing IDPS in such a way as to increase the 
detection accuracy and reduce the packet drop rate. Overall, it reduces the individual IDS load 
but increases the number of IDS units in turn increases the power consumption of the web 
server farm. This is because in a web server farm, the packet is repeatedly analysed once in the 
firewall and then in IDS and again in webserver, this multiple reception of the same packet 
operate through full TCP/IP stack, on each box, which in turn increases the power consumption 
of the web server farm. In developing algorithms, the researcher should aim to move IDPS 
functionality into other devices thus saving considerable power saved by eliminating multiple 
packet reception of the same packet.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Figure 1.2 Thesis Overview 
This thesis has two major research themes and has eight chapters as shown in Figure 1.2. 
The first chapter (this chapter) provides an overview of Distributed Denial of Service attacks 
(DDoS) and outlines the severity of DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks. It covers the issues in current 
IDPS systems and research challenges when detecting DDoS types of attack, especially when the 
flash crowds are involved.  
The second chapter focused on a literature review which describes existing work that attempts to 
block Net-DDoS, App-DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks and points to why the App-DDoS 
methods are limited in their efficacy. This chapter also briefly reviews web server power 
consumption and discusses existing work related to reducing the power consumption of the 
IDPS and security devices.  
The third chapter explores the research questions arising from the literature search. 
Chapter 4 explains the novel architecture and algorithms that adaptively block IoT App-DDoS 
attacks with far less punishment of the flash crowds. The chapter then goes on to describe the 
experimental system used to trial the theory and the results obtained. 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                              Introduction  
9 
 
 Chapter 5 presents second major research topic that measures and analyses the power 
consumption of traditional IDS systems such as BRO and Snort. This extends the previous 
chapter’s experiments by replacing Bro and Snort with an IDS daemon that works with Apache.  
From the experimental findings, the research proposes a novel architecture for security devices 
that reduces CPU load and hence power consumption.  
Chapter 6 describes the different types of attacks handled by an IDPS and explores alternative 
attack detection strategies for web servers and firewalls. From the research findings, this chapter 
explains a novel security architecture that eliminates the IDPS as a standalone function. 
Chapter 7 discusses future work and offers some further research directions 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and discusses the main successes and limitations of the work.
 10 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
any years ago, it was acceptable to lose some legitimate traffic when attack traffic was          
blocked. In many cases today, such as IoT, e-Bay and online shopping, this lost 
legitimate traffic represents a financial loss that is no longer acceptable. Several methods have 
been proposed to differentiate attack traffic from normal human traffic and flash traffic but the 
normal result is to punish both the attack traffic and the legitimate (and possibly profitable) flash 
traffic. This chapter critically reviews existing methods that attempt to differentiate DDoS and 
IoT DDoS attack traffic from flash traffic in a web server farm.  Most of the existing work 
focused on Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) that compare current traffic 
with old traffic profiles and see any new profile as an attack. These approaches are problematic. 
The new attack traffic seldom has the same characteristics as the old attack traffic. Furthermore, 
flash crowds may be mistaken for attacks. Another important issue is the power usage of these 
IDPS devices, either as standalone boxes or software in the cloud. It is found that this approach 
which is now standard practice is inefficient in terms of energy usage and adds to the carbon 
footprint of a web server farm.  
2.1 Attack detection techniques 
DDoS attacks are commonly separated into network layer DDoS attacks (Net-DDoS) and 
application layer DDoS attacks (App-DDoS) [24]. This section will explore the existing detection 
techniques used for Net-DDoS attacks and App-DDoS attacks and explains weaknesses in the 
current methods.  
2.1.1 Net-DDoS detection techniques 
Detection below the application layer of the OSI model is preferred as it can be placed in 
routers and other network devices and not affect or impede the application layer. Net-DDoS 
attacks usually fall into one of the following categories; ICMP flooding [25], SYN floods, and 
UDP flooding. Net-DDoS detection on a network device is independent and transparent to the 
target server, which does not need to contribute anything to this effort. Net-DDoS attacks are 
not that difficult to detect as stateful packet inspection can detect most attack activity. As a 
M 
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result, there are many commercial products with Net-DDoS detection and blocking capability 
and considerable research in this area.  
Authors Wang et al [26], Yau et al [27], Mahajan et al [28], Park et al [29], John Haggerty [30], 
Ravi et al [31] and Fabio et al [32] propose a range of ways to mitigate the DDoS. They proposed 
the following algorithms: puzzle solving, router throttling, pushback blocking, monitoring time 
to live (TTL) and ID fields, enhanced bogon lists, and source-based filtering. Depending on the 
packet characteristics, Cabrera et al [33], Yuan et al [34] and Mirkovic et al [35] have tried to 
differentiate the flash traffic from attack traffic. Some of these methods are worth examining in 
more detail. 
Wang et al [26] used puzzles to mitigate bandwidth exhaustion, in which the router activates the 
puzzle mechanism if the loss rate exceeds a threshold and the attacker has to solve the puzzle. A 
puzzle has good detection capability but it can be very annoying to a legitimate user. Yau et al  
[27] simply throttle the router once the server becomes busy and this punishes both attack and 
legitimate traffic. Depending on the packet characteristics, Cabrera et al [33]  implemented 
Management Information Base (MIB) data contains variable parameters that derived from the 
incoming packets and routing statistics to detect attacks this has the problem that all traffic from 
a problem router is punished including any legitimate traffic. Yuan et al [34] used cross-
correlation analysis to capture the traffic patterns and then to decide if an attack is occurring, but 
again legitimate traffic is punished along with attack traffic. Mirkovic et al [35]monitored the 
asymmetry of two-way packet rates to identify attacks in edge routers. The references Cabrera et 
al [33] Yuan et al [34]  Mirkovic et al [35] all make incorrect assumptions that legitimate, and 
possibly profitable flash traffic will have the same statistical properties as older traffic. Flash 
traffic is often coming to a site for different reasons than older traffic and thus possesses 
different statistical properties, and can be misinterpreted as attack traffic. There are many 
research on detecting attacks based on IP addresses such as author Park et al  [29] monitors time 
to live TTL and ID fields to detect IP spoofing attacks, recent work by author Ravi et al [31] 
introduces the bogon list for detection and Fabio et al [32] filters the malicious traffic using 
source-based filtering. It is important to note that only botnet attacks hide IP address by 
spoofing a valid IP address, zombie and IoT attacks do not hide IP addresses and the detection 
mechanism will not work on many network domains where pings are not allowed. The 
references from Mahajan et al [28] and John Haggerty [30] implements a push back and 
traceback mechanism based on attack signatures, the algorithm suffers when an intelligent 
attacker varies the traffic characteristics over time. There are many good techniques used at the 
network layer for detection and blocking DDoS but the algorithms are weak in that they 
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punishing legitimate traffic as well as attack traffic. Given the financial loss, this may imply such 
methods should not be preferred. There has been a lot of work published as regards 
differentiating flash crowd traffic from DDoS attacks at the network layer, but they all penalise 
the benign traffic and possibly profitable traffic. 
2.1.2 App-DDoS detection techniques 
Implementing detection algorithms at the application layer is difficult when compared to the 
network layer. Network blocking methods are carried out in a router or IDS and need not to be 
on the application’s host machine. Blocking at the application layer usually requires one host to 
run both the application and the DDoS detection and blocking software. Further, the application 
may need to be modified to work with the DDoS software. Despite these problems, there are 
good reasons for working at the application layer and some good algorithms for DDoS detection 
and blocking. There has been some work on detection of DDoS at the application layer but 
again the existing methods punish attack traffic and the profitable flash crowds. 
Ranjan et al [36] and Yen et al [37] used a statistical approach to detect the DDoS at the 
application layer. Ranjan et al  [36] employed rate limiting as the primary detection mechanism 
and Yen et al [37] constraints any source that makes random web page requests. These statistical 
methods are used only for monitoring abnormal traffic but cannot distinguish flash traffic from 
attack traffic. J. Yu et al [38] mitigate DDoS attack at the application layer based on the Trust 
values. Trust values are calculated using server bandwidth and the detection is done once the 
server exceeds the threshold. It would be better to detect an attacker before server becomes 
busy.  The method also penalizes legitimate users along with attack traffic.  Authors using 
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) 
to detect DDoS include Kandula et al [39] and  Boyd et al [40]; implemented as a puzzle 
authentication mechanism. Users have to enter the letters shown in an image, which is very 
annoying. David Pogue [41] stated that CAPTCHA really stands for “Computer Annoying 
People with Time-wasting Challenges”. Some references [42-44] block DDoS by using special 
browsers with different security mechanisms but this limits the people who can access the site. 
Jung et al [45] filter using IP addresses at the HTTP level but the algorithm will not work on 
DDoS attack that uses many legitimate IP addresses which is typical of a zombie or IoT attack. 
The approach may also fail when NAT is used. The work of Yi Xie et al [24, 46] introduces a 
new way to monitor the DDoS attack using hidden semi-Markov model, a key weakness is an 
assumption that new legitimate flash traffic will have the same statistics as older traffic but this is 
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a highly questionable assumption. For example Click Frenzy [44] is an online shopping event, 
where retailers will experience a sudden significant increase in legitimate traffic (flash crowds) 
during the event. The aggregate statistics of flash crowds look very similar to the DDoS attack 
traffic and traditional detection methods interpret the flash crowds as an attack, start dropping 
packets, and so lose profitable user traffic.   Financially it is not acceptable to lose profitable flash 
crowds while trying to block DDoS attack traffic. 
All the techniques examined make the incorrect assumption that old traffic matches the statistics 
of new flash traffic.  This leads to dropping both attack traffic and legitimate traffic. 
App-DDoS attacks are much harder to detect than Net-DDoS attacks because the traffic looks 
much like a real user. In a well-crafted zombie attack, each zombie host is generating a traffic 
level that is not unreasonable, has a legitimate IP address, and is not doing anything with 
network protocols which is unusual. The survey by Durcekova et al [47] proves the necessity of 
new research methods on DDoS attack detection at the application layer.   Overall, a new 
algorithm is needed at the application layer that reduces the punishment of the legitimate flash 
traffic and successfully detects attack traffic. 
2.1.3 IoT DDoS detection techniques 
With the rapid revolution of IoT, there is a tremendous increase in the Internet traffic.  This 
is welcomed by many as IoT takes industry to the next level as “Smart Industry” or “Industrie 
4.0” [48]. The explosion of IoT devices is not so welcome from the security point of view as 
poorly designed software or non-updatable software has enabled these devices to be used in 
DDoS attacks.  High jacked IoT devices that act like real users are a problem that present 
significant difficulties for traditional detection methods. Methods to detect DDoS attacks were 
inadequate before IoT systems as discussed in section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 became a problem, and will 
be even more ineffective as IoT based DDoS attacks increase [49]. IoT DDoS attacks are similar 
to standard DDoS attacks emanating from personal computers which have been infected with 
malware and are controlled en masse by an attacker (zombie machines). A key difference is that 
there are potentially a much larger number of IoT devices and so their behaviour can be 
different while still maintaining a huge aggregate level of attack traffic. 
 
IoT based DDoS attacks detection methods reported include spoof detection [50], blacklists 
[45], threshold limits based on traffic volume [45], CPU memory, and even electrical power 
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supply [51]. This method may detect Net-DDoS attacks but they do not detect App-DDoS 
attacks and punish profitable user traffic along with the attack traffic. The authors Bertino and 
Islam [52] claim that having stronger passwords and maintaining a whitelist of addresses might 
block the Mirai botnet [18]  but it will be ineffectual against a DDoS attack where each zombie 
acts vaguely like a real human user.  
IoT App-DDoS attacks on web servers do not spoof addresses, and do nothing unusual with 
network protocols, rather they mimic a very large number of real users. Current detection 
methods for IoT attacks at the application layer include learning automation approaches [53] and 
DDoS detection scenario with nodes [51]. In both these researches, the abnormal traffic is 
filtered first on the threshold limit and then identifies the DDoS attackers by analysing the 
number of requests made to the server. Based on this approach, the chance of penalising flash 
crowds is very high. 
The existing work has good solutions for DDoS attacks that can be detected at the network 
level. Imagine that millions of IoT devices instead join an App-layer DDoS attack where each 
IoT device mimics a human user. There appears to be no viable protection against such an 
attack. While such attacks have not yet been problematic, if Net-layer DDoS attacks are rendered 
ineffective then the DDoS business will turn to App-layer DDoS methods based on large 
numbers of IoT devices. Looking to the future, we need to develop an effective App-layer 
DDoS protection methods before such attacks become a problem.  
2.1.4 Effectiveness of Network layer and Application layer detection 
Behaviour based detection is one of the best ways to differentiate DDoS traffic from flash 
crowds (benign users) and this approach works well at the application layer. Several researchers 
have analysed packet data to differentiate DDoS behaviour from user behaviour. Packet header 
information may include inter arrival time, source address, destination address, port, protocol, 
and TTL value. To separate DDoS traffic from user traffic, the network traffic flows are 
examined by aggregate flows, correlations, congestion, connection counts, hop counts and rate 
of flow are measured based on packet fields, Round-trip delay time(RTT) and packet loss as 
discussed below. This section explores researches discriminating DDoS traffic from user traffic 
built on packet analysis.  
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2.1.4.1 Effectiveness of packet analysis at Network layer 
Author Theerasak Thapngam et al [54] analyse packet transmission by calculating correlations 
between the packet arrival rate and time to study the DDoS behaviour. Author Ramin Fadaei 
Fouladi et al [55] stated different frequency network flow represent different properties and the 
periodicity in packet arrivals are measured using RTT. Author Jie Wang et al [56] extracted the 
packet information include packet protocol type, packet flag, source IP, destination IP and some 
packet fields to define signatures. These signatures created using two threshold values T and N 
where T represents the specified time window (TW) whereas N represents the specified number 
of packets. Author Shui Yu et al [57] discriminate DDoS attacks from flash crowds by flow 
correlation coefficient. The flow correlation coefficient is calculated on the number of packets 
for a given time interval. Jung et al [45] distinguish attack traffic by using IP addresses at the 
HTTP level. 
The aforementioned methods separate attack traffic from user using network layer data and the 
online traffic statistics compared to predefined models of normal traffic. A problem with all 
these methods is that zombie machines can be easily programmed to produce web page requests 
at a traffic rate comparable to a real human user. Such DDoS attacks are indistinguishable from 
user traffic based on network layer measurements [58]. Network layer data are useful to filter the 
abnormal traffic and less sophisticated DoS and DDoS attacks but will not completely separate 
more sophisticated DDoS attack traffic from user traffic. 
2.1.4.2 Effectiveness of packet analysis at Application layer 
  Author Yang-seo Choi et al  [59]  detect HTTP GET flooding attacks using HTTP GET 
request.  The HTTP GET request behaviours are checked for spoofed IP addresses. The 
thresholds parameters are Inter-GET Request Packet-Gap and the HTTP GET Request count. 
Attacks usually have short Inter-GET Request Packet-Gaps and more HTTP GET Request 
counts. Similar to this approach, Author Junho Choi et al [58] differentiated characteristics 
between DDoS attack and normal traffic based on HTTP GET request behaviours. The benign 
user requests web pages in a random manner whereas the attacker accesses the same page 
repeatedly. Author Junho Choi et al concluded that application layer DDoS attacks are 
nonintrusive and protocol-compliant, these attacks not be defended against using network layer 
solutions. Research on Apache server modules [60] such as Mod_evasive and Mod_security 
show they are somewhat effective for DDoS detection. Mod_evasive DDoS detection is based 
on number of single page access per unit time. Yi Xie et al  [24, 46] implemented the Markov 
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chain is discussed earlier in section 2.1.2 that measures web page access times from the first web 
page access.  
The methods reviewed above are essentially counter based and do not analyse the inter-arrival 
time of HTTP requests and so are limited in the discrimination they can achieve. Consider 
accessing 10 web pages at a website; each has an acceptable time window based on the time from 
the first web page access. Variations in the viewing times of earlier web pages may push later 
web pages out of the acceptable range and so legitimate users will be classified as attackers. 
Consider the websites such as ticket sales for a concert when it first opens, online shopping 
bargain days, or simply a news article or blog post. Flash traffic may induce a large increase in the 
number of legitimate users attempting to access a website simultaneously, and much jumping 
between pages, which stresses the network links of servers. The methods reviewed will usually 
interpret the flash crowd as an attack and limit the traffic to the server thus causing a financial 
loss to the site owners and annoyance to the users. It is very important to separate the attack 
traffic without annoying users or losing profitable traffic and none of the method reviewed really 
achieve this goal. 
2.1.5 Commercial products 
The detection strategies used by commercial products such as Cisco and Juniper are very 
interesting. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) [61]detects DoS attack by using stateful 
packet inspection (SPI) and Stateful Firewall Check. This provides an added layer of network 
protection but it not suitable for application level DDoS attacks because it blocks the legitimate 
user while blocking DDoS.  
Juniper Intrusion Detection and Prevention system (IDPS) [62-64]perform multistage analysis 
from connection monitoring to protocol analysis, to botclient classification and maintains the 
state for each protected server. Juniper App-DDoS protection use a hit rate threshold parameter 
to classify a client from benign user to DDoS attacker. The hit rate threshold is based on the 
number of contexts seen in specified interval. The context is an application protocol context 
such as http-url and dns-cname; which amounts to a blacklist check. As mentioned earlier, if 
both attack traffic and flash crowd target the website, the hit rate threshold value will see the 
legitimate as the attack traffic and result in blocking the profitable legitimate user. The blacklist 
style checking will not detect new attackers or well-crafted DDoS zombie-style attacks.  
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ARBOR (Adaptive Response to Buffer Overflow) generates a buffer overflow signature 
automatically based on behavioural modelling. Sanmeet Kaur [65] undertook a on comparative 
analysis of automatic attack signature generation systems and stated that the ARBOR system has 
false negatives, and allowed dome DoS attacks to escape punishment. 
Products such as Bluecoat, and Nexusgurad monitor the entire handshaking process (ICMP, 
SYN, and UDP) block any half-opened connection, and mitigate attacks at the network layer by 
cooperating with IDS and central databases of attack signatures. These excellent products do not 
cope well with DDoS attacks so we may infer they use a similar mechanism as described by other 
researchers. 
The App-DDoS detection mechanisms described in the literature as well as in the well-known 
commercial products may have some App-DDoS detection ability but they also have significant 
problems and so better methods must be developed. In particular, the described methods punish 
the legitimate traffic as well as attack traffic which can reduce the accessibility and profitability of 
Internet services. A key weakness is the inability to respond to changing conditions such as 
legitimate flash traffic.  
2.1.5.1 IDPS  
Research on IDPS is a wide area that plays a significant role in network security system. IDPS 
are implemented to detect an abnormal traffic commonly named as “attacks” [66] and execute 
preventive measures when attacks detected. The common IDPS techniques include signature 
based, anomaly based, and model or state based techniques. Signature based detection [22, 23, 
67-71] matches the signature of a packet (usually within the payload) with known problems to 
detect known attacks. This detection technique is ineffective for unknown threats and zombies. 
Anomaly based detection [22, 23, 67, 68, 70-72] is alerts the system when there is abnormal 
traffic but with this approach there is a high chance of getting false positive attack detection 
errors because of benign activity that deviates significantly from historical profiles. Stateful 
protocol analysis [22, 23, 67, 68, 72] looks beyond a single packet to look at packet sequences 
and aims to identify problems and attacks. Anomaly based detection is the most preferred 
techniques than signature based technique and stateful protocol analysis is due to its high 
capability in detecting novel attacks.  
Mahbod et al [66] evaluated and compared intrusion detection techniques. The author mainly 
focussed on anomaly detection is the primary approach in intrusion detection and summarises 
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the published work from 2000-2008. The author reported the techniques used in anomaly-based 
detection degrades the performance of the detection algorithms.  
There is significant research on ways to improve the performance of IDPS. Two authors, Katkar 
and Zaman worked with feature selection.  Katkar et al [71, 73] used naive Bayesian classifiers 
with numeric to binary data pre-processing for DDoS detection. The Naive Bayesian 
classification algorithm assumes strong independence between variables is not always true.  
Zaman et al [74] implemented a lightweight IDS to overcome poor detection rate based on two 
different approaches. The first approach uses a feature selection approach by applying Fuzzy 
Enhanced Support Vector Decision Function (Fuzzy ESVDF) algorithm and the second 
approach uses an IDS classification scheme. The research methods [71, 73-75] aim to select the 
best-trained dataset and then use that data set for future detection. Smart attacks vary their 
features with time and so an analysis with a trained dataset will miss such attacks and may punish 
new legitimate traffic. The feature selection practices, trained dataset and the sampling 
techniques can significantly affects the detection method evaluation and degrades the 
performance of the detection algorithms [76, 77]. Most IDPS methods [78] will not work for 
DDoS attacks and as well, IDPS consume power due to multiple packet reception. 
2.2 Power Usage in a web server farm 
This thesis is primarily aimed at detecting and blocking of DDoS attack traffic from zombie 
or IoT devices but with any network-based system, the effect on power consumption should be 
analysed. The American Chemical Centre [79] stated that the network devices produces more 
than 830 million tons of carbon dioxide which has a major environmental impact. Both to save 
power costs and reduce carbon emissions it is important to gauge the effect of any new protocol 
or method on power consumption. The purpose of this review is to discuss the power 
consumption of the web servers and to analyse the existing methodologies. 
2.2.1 CPU Utilization and Power consumption 
Power management of web server’s systems is an area of ongoing research. Sharma et al [80] 
states that power consumption on a web server is economically and ecologically significant. In 
2002 Bohrer et al [81] started focussing on managing power consumption in web servers and 
their experimental results shows that the CPU consumes the largest fraction of the system 
Power. Mukherjee et al [82] experimentally observed that Disk and Memory I/O usage had a 
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negligible effect on server power consumption, whereas the CPU utilization is linearly related to 
power consumption. Given these observations, it is important to minimize CPU utilization in 
order to reduce power consumption. Minas et al [83] mentioned that CPU usage in a web server 
is the most significant factor in power consumption and his results on a quad core Intel 
processor shows that for a given CPU the power consumption is linearly related to the CPU 
utilization. Other processors have a similar relationship. From these observations, we can 
conclude that it is appropriate to use CPU utilization as a proxy for power consumption of 
software providing that the CPU type and hardware is the same. 
A problem when evaluating the power usage of several devices is that the CPU can vary between 
physical devices or even virtual machines in the cloud and so cumulative CPU utilization is not a 
good measure of power usage. 
2.2.2 IDS Power Consumption 
 
Figure 2.1 Web server in a Host-based system 
In a host-based system as shown in Figure 2.1, devices such as proxy servers, firewalls, and 
Intrusion Detection/Prevention systems (IDS/IPS) secure web servers. In a web server farm 
such devices may be run in virtual machines. These services are crucial as they can eliminate or 
reduce attack traffic. It is notable that in Figure 2.1, a typical web server system, the traffic is 
received, analysed, and transmitted three times before getting to the web server. Only the 
analysis activity has value with the repeated reception and transmission being an overhead that 
consumes power. The IDS function is of particular interest as if it is found to be inefficient in 
terms of power use then its functionality might be able to be absorbed into other devices. There 
is significant research on ways to improve the performance of IDS/IPS that reduces CPU load 
and hence power consumption. Zaman et al [74, 84] implemented a light weight IDS to 
overcome resource consumption but this achieved poor detection rate based on two different 
approaches. Wheeler et al [85] introduced three levels of parallelism using node, component and 
sub component level and stateless analysis but this achieved little in the way of power savings. 
Vasiliadis et al [86] implemented a multi-parallel IDS architecture (MIDEA) for high-
performance processing and stateful analysis of network traffic and while this worked well it is 
expensive and complex to implement [23, 87]. The major  flaw of these [74, 84-86] methods are 
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repetition [23] where one packet undergoes the reception, inspection, and transmission several 
times hence there is waste of CPU computing time and electrical power. Waleed et al [23] 
suggested parallel NIDS to reduce packet drop rate and process more packets in less time during 
heavy traffic, however sudden increases in traffic will result in packet loss. This approach 
requires many IDS in parallel that in turn increases the CPU load and leads to increased power 
consumption and cost. Several researchers [25, 87-89] have used various methods to implement 
a lightweight IDS approach but the overall result has been to increase the workload on the web 
server. 
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3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
here is much research into blocking DDoS attacks but an analysis of the published work 
has uncovered several significant problems. 
 When the system contains web servers, there is multiple reception and analysis of HTTP 
packets, done at least once by a firewall, once by an IDPS and once by any server. This 
multiple reception and analysis costs computing and electrical power. 
 All the security devices placed at the network ingress point must handle the full load of 
normal and DDoS traffic thus requiring powerful, power hungry and expensive devices 
 Most methods will not work for DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks where each zombie 
generates apparently legitimate traffic that differs from real human traffic only in the flow, 
timing and frequency of web resources accesses. 
Considering the above flaws lead to the scope of the research. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 “Novel methods for DDoS 
detection” develops a novel architecture which 
can differentiate flash traffic from DDoS and 
IoT DDoS attacks thus reducing the loss of 
profitable human user traffic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
Research Question 1:  
Current DDoS or IoT DDoS 
detection methods punish both the 
attack traffic as well the legitimate and 
profitable flash traffic.  Is it possible to 
develop novel adaptive methods to 
detect and block DDoS and IoT 
DDoS attack traffic and reduce 
punishment of the legitimate traffic? 
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Chapter 5 “Power consumption minimisation” 
examines the functionality of IDS and finds a 
weakness in the existing architectures which 
increases power usage. A solution is proposed and 
measurement confirms that the new architecture 
saves significant electrical power.  
 
 
 
 
The work in the previous research questions 
shows that the traditional IDS functionality can be 
absorbed into a firewall or the web server. 
 
 
Guided by the weaknesses found in the published work and based on the research questions the 
following publications are originated:  
 S. Sivabalan and P. J. Radcliffe, "A novel framework to detect and block DDoS attack at 
the application layer," in TENCON Spring Conference, 2013 IEEE, 2013, pp. 578-582. 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6584511/ (Published)  
            This paper [90] presents a novel architecture provides the basic ideas for developing 
algorithms to protect web servers from DDoS attack.  
 S. Sivabalan and P. Radcliffe, "Real time calibration of DDoS blocking rules for Web 
Servers,"    Computer, vol. 4, pp. 42-50, 2016. 
http://bapress.ca/ccc/ccc2016_2/201605_3_16052567.pdf (Published)             
             Based on the fundamental ideas, this paper [91] presents a novel architecture to detect 
and   block Distributed Denial of Service attacks with minimal punishment to legitimate 
users (traffic originating from a human user). This has developed an algorithm based on 
scoring attacker detection rules in real time. Chapter 4 explores this research work. 
Research Question 3: 
 Is it possible to eliminate any 
network devices from a web server farm 
and so reduce electrical power 
consumption? 
Research Question 2: 
Web server farms use considerable 
electrical power.  For the purpose of 
blocking DDoS attacks at the protocol 
level what can be done to reduce power 
usage? 
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 Sivabalan, S., & Radcliffe, P. (2017). Detecting IoT zombie attacks on web servers. 2017 
27th International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference 
(ITNAC), 1-3.  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8215358/(Published) 
            This paper [92] further extended for the recent IoT revolution on DDoS attacks. This 
proposed that the novel architecture is best suited to detect IoT DDoS attacks. Chapter 4 
presents and discusses about the novel IoT DDoS attack detection methodology. 
 S. Sivabalan and P. Radcliffe, "Power efficient secure web servers," International 
Journal of Network Security, vol. 20, pp. 303-311, 2018. 
https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/view/rmit:46529 (Published) 
           This paper [93] developed a power efficient model to secure web servers. Chapter 5 
shares the information of this research work. 
 S. Sivabalan and P. Radcliffe, "Feasibility of eliminating IDPS devices from a web 
server farm   " International Journal of Network Security, vol. 20, 2018. 
http://ijns.jalaxy.com.tw/contents/ijns-v20-n3/ijns-2018-v20-n3-p9315-0.pdf (Published) 
            From the key ideas of latter research, this paper [94] presented an effective novel 
architecture for web server security.  Chapter 6 contributes the ideas of this research 
work.  
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4 NOVEL METHODS FOR DETECTING DDOS AND IOT 
DDOS ATTACKS 
he modern web is now relied upon by many people for fast and reliable information. It 
has become an important commercial highway and as such its performance must be 
protected and enhanced. Detection of DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks are crucial particularly 
when flash crowds are involved. It is no longer acceptable to block both attack traffic and 
legitimate users as this will reduce reliability, performance and profitability of a web site. 
Previous work has two major problems, first the rules for detecting DDoS and IoT DDoS 
attacks are based on the idea that a change in traffic statistics represent an attack. Secondly the 
data available to make judgements about traffic is limited to counters and traffic averages with no 
detailed information on a user’s browsing history to aid this judgement. This section outlines a 
novel architecture [90-92] that learns from the traffic and has more user browsing history which 
will enable superior decisions to be made as to whether a user is a human or an attacker.      
4.1 Groundwork 
Browsing behaviour as viewed at the web server has information that may be able to 
discriminate between attackers and legitimate user traffic. This research aims to build up 
detection algorithms based on this browser behaviour analysis. There are three key aspects to 
consider: 
 Browsing information available at the server. 
 Data structures for storing this browsing information.  
 Memory requirements and minimization methods for this data. 
4.1.1 Browsing information  
Browser behaviour analysis examines the behaviour of the user interacting with the web 
servers. Consider a user accessing a web page shown in Figure 4.1, the notable significant 
behaviours are the user navigation, the viewing time and the traversal time through the website. 
T 
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Navigation is the user following a specific pattern or sequence in accessing the web page or 
invoking functionality on the one web page. The viewing period (v1, v2, v3) is the amount of 
time the user actively engaged on each stable web page. The traversal time (t1, t2) is the period 
between the pages. The traversal time is measured whenever the user hits HTTP request to the 
webserver. This thesis study is based on the viewing period and future research will work on the 
traversal time. These behaviours are used to characterise the normal user from attacker. To study 
these behaviours and discriminate the attackers, it is necessary to know the browsing information 
captured as follows. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Browsing behaviour  
 
User browsing data available at the web server includes user IP which represents the network 
address of the client, server IP indicates the network address of the server, the browser type, 
URI is the client web request made to the server, the request method that was used to access the 
web page, the script to execute, more detailed information of the client web request and the time 
when the request was made to the server.  
For example, if a client requested a webpage www.example.com, the below browsing 
information is available-  
Client IP            = 192.168.1.1 
Server IP           = 138.18.1.1 
Uri                     = /index.php 
Request Method = GET  
Browser type     = Mozilla/5.0(X11; Ubuntu; Linux)  
Script filename   = /var/www/index.php 
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In Apache web server, the built-in PHP variables [95] are used to capture this information as 
listed in the Table 4.1: 
      Table 4.1 PHP Variables 
 
These are the key parameters to log for implementing detection rules. 
4.1.2 Linked list data structure 
Saving the details of many user’s browsing behaviour could result in excessive memory use. 
To check on the feasibility of such a scheme it is important to perform some basic calculation to 
work out the memory required. Of the many data storage schemes [96], the linked list stands out 
as a way to store data in real time where units must be quickly added and deleted. Given a good 
quality operating system that allows dynamic memory allocation and destruction a linked list 
makes it easy to insert or delete an event.  
4.1.3 Memory requirements 
A linked list based record or log maintains a record of browsing activities performed by all 
users of the web sites. This log lays an empirical foundation for the development of detection 
mechanism. Considering the sizeable data collected, the memory requirements are notable 
because saving and manipulating data may consume significant RAM and slowdown the system. 
Consider the user simultaneously requesting web pages, for example requesting amazon, eBay, 
Facebook, or accessing email which contains images that needs a large amount of memory. This 
research has done several simple experiments with a single user actively accessing the web pages 
for 10minutes from Amazon, eBay and Google search.  This generated on average 1800 HTTP 
Get Requests which includes requests for image and other resources.  When put into a linked list 
PHP variable Value
_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:27.0) 
Ge c ko/20100101 Fire fox/27.0
_SERVER["SERVER_ADDR"] 138.18.1.1
_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] 192.168.1.1
_SERVER["SCRIPT_FILENAME"] /var/www/html/inde x.php
_SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] GET
_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] /inde x.php
_SERVER["REQUEST_TIME"] 1480555965
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Storage for all GET requests = storage_size * 1800_of_GETS = 140 KB                         (1) 
 
 
Storage with time compression = 78 bytes * 10 min * 60 secs/min / 2 secs = 23 KB       (2)      
that stored pointers, and basic timing and URI information this took approximately 140 KB of 
storage, 14 KB per minute of user time.   
For a 10-minute scan period with 10,000 simultaneous users this represents 1.4GB of RAM 
which is feasible. 
From equation (1) the approximate storage_size of each data record is 78 bytes long. It would be 
ideal to reduce this storage by ignoring some requests but any throwing away of requests creates 
a security weakness.  For example, if image requests were ignored then an attacker could 
repeatedly request the image and not be detected as an attacker. One solution is time based 
compression where each 2 second period has one linked list record and a counter for the 
number of accesses in that 2 seconds.  The maximum storage for 10 minutes is thus-   
From equation (2), 117KB of memory freed by using time based compression. A second 
approach is to limit the period over which a user browsing behaviour is analysed to as short a 
time as possible. Time based garbage collection on a linked list can easily achieve this goal. 
Analysis of real running systems will show if attacker detection rules need 10 minutes to trigger, 
or whether this period can be further decreased. One weakness of a strictly time based deletion 
policy is a high bandwidth attack from a single source which creates many linked list entries and 
overwhelms the memory. The linked list per user must have a maximum limit for the number of 
entries and when this is exceeded older entries are thrown away. Triggering such a limit 
automatically classifies a user as an attacker. 
For the purposes of this research all GET requests were put into the linked list in order to 
investigate the detection ability of rules. Garbage collection based on time and maximum entries 
per user will ensure that memory requirements stay within reasonable limits. In future work the 
effectiveness of time compression and other algorithms will be examined. 
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4.2 Two-Dimensional Web page Daemon (TDWD): Real time learning for 
DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks  
A Two-Dimensional Web page Daemon (TDWD) was designed and built into the Apache 
web server in order to capture and analyse user web requests at the HTTP level. TDWD saves 
user requests and provides a new and effective real-time scoring algorithm to provide greater 
accuracy in detecting and blocking attacks in a dynamic traffic environment. In previous 
algorithms found in the literature, the user’s request will undergo signature analysis based on a 
fixed set of unchanging rules. In the proposed method, multiple blocking rules are implemented 
and calibrated using a very occasional CAPTCHA. Previous work mentioned that using 
CAPTCHAs is annoying [41], so the TDWD implements CAPTCHAs as AYAH (Are You a 
Human) page to only a tiny fraction of the traffic, note the “1 in N” pathway in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 TDWD - Real-time Scoring Process 
This will determine if a user is a human or an attacker though not with perfect certainty. 
These 1 in N user requests are evaluated by all rules, both active and inactive. If the rule correctly 
predicts the user type (human or attacker as determined by the AYAH page) then it’s 
“rule_accuracy” rating is incremented, if it incorrectly predicts the type of user the accuracy 
rating is decrement, if the rule cannot offer an opinion then it’s accuracy rating is left unaffected. 
The rating is windowed to between zero and 100. Incrementing or decrementing may not go 
outside this range. Any user request from this 1 in N group that goes to an AYAH page, and is 
determined not to be a human, will be blocked.  
All user requests apart from that small number sent to an AYAH page (N-1 requests) get sent 
directly to the blocking algorithm in Figure 4.2. This blocking algorithm applies only active rules, 
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typically those with a high enough accuracy rating and can decide to pass, block, or delay 
suspicious user activity. 
Each rule evaluating the user request generates a rule result-  
+1 = user request is from an attacker. 
 0  = no decision.  
-1  = user request is a human.  
If a rule generates a probability that a user is an attacker, then that probability might replace the 
+-1 value. 
An aggregate score (a check result) for the user request is calculated as follows- 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Server Load Limit 
Given a user request gets a particular attacker_rating how does this translate into a decision on 
whether to block the user request or let it pass? From our work the ratings cluster around very 
high values or very low values so a threshold of 50 (half way between 0 and 100) works well. 
Future work will examine if it is possible to better set this value dynamically based on properties 
of the aggregate traffic. 
Chapter 4                                                                Novel Methods for Detecting DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks 
 
33 
 
The decision to block, pass, or delay can be based on the attacker_rating and the total traffic 
being experience by the web server as shown in Figure 4.3. The delay method was not tested in 
our implementation and will be future work.  
The algorithms developed satisfy the major objective of our work, in a dynamic environment  to 
reduce punishment of the (profitable) legitimate traffic while blocking the DDoS And IoT 
DDoS attacks. Without the real-time calibration provided by the occasional AYAH page, this 
goal would not be achievable. 
4.2.1 TDWD implementation  
 
 
Figure 4.4 TDWD Implementation 
The TDWD is a hybrid structure made from two separate daemons that communicate by 
shared memory. The first is programmed in C for speed and is named the two-dimensional 
linked list daemon. The second is a PHP script called the web page daemon. As the name 
implies, two-dimensional linked list daemon saves web requests in a two-dimensional list, first by 
user IP and then by time. Analysis of this two-dimensional list can determine if a user has 
violated a usage rule. Each web page request calls the web page daemon that sends the web page 
details to the two-dimensional Linked List daemon via shared memory. Shared memory was used 
to allow very fast interaction between Apache and a Linked List Rule Daemon shown in Figure 
4.4.  
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4.2.1.1  Two-dimensional linked list daemon: Linked list rule implementation  
The two-dimensional linked list daemon is implemented using C code. The two primary 
components of the daemon implementations are: 
 Linked list manager  
 Rule engine 
The linked list manager scans the shared memory which is written to by the Apache web server 
every time a web page is accessed. The list manger inserts the web events in to a two-
dimensional linked list shown in Figure 4.5 based on IP address and browsing events with time-
based garbage collection. The horizontal list is a time ordered list of web page accesses from one 
client IP with the newest near the head. The vertical list holds the client IPs currently active and 
is in no particular order. The manager works through the linked list and eliminates any event that 
is too old with reference to the time-based garbage collection, and any client IP that has no 
events. 
 
Figure 4.5 Linked list manager 
The rule engine plays a vital role in implementing detection rules and scans the 2D linked list 
looking for rule violations.  
Examples of some simple rules include:  
 Cyclic page limit: The client requests a number of similar page accesses per second. For 
example, an attacker may control the thousands of zombie systems programmed to make 
a continuous request for web pages http://page1 http://page2 http://page3. The 
daemon may also set a limit for the pages per second allowed for any one client.  
 Random limit: the user appears to be accessing pages at random, not in any sensible 
order. 
 Repeated same page access: The client requests the same page again and again. The 
daemon may apply an initial burst limit and then a pages per second limit.  
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 Out of context access: The client accesses a resource such as video or audio outside a 
normal web page access.  
 Attempted administration access: the server can report attempted accesses of the 
administration.  
 Excessive access time: the user is accessing the website for much longer than normal 
users. This rule is not suitable for some websites such as online magazines and online 
news.  
 Excessive repeated access: accessing the site for more than N sessions per period.   
Research methods discussed in literature review, calculated the window time from the start of 
the first web page access  [24, 46]. In this new method, all the detection rules mentioned above 
are implemented by considering the whole web page access sequence that gives more detail of 
the user browsing behaviour and provides minimal punishment to legitimate traffic.  
4.2.1.2 Web page Daemon: Apache web server implementation. 
The Apache web server plays a major role in discriminating the attack traffic from the legitimate 
users. Each web page requires a one line include statement which refers to PHP code that 
achieves the following as shown in Figure 4.6-  
 Share client details with shared memory.  
 Share web page access details with shared memory. 
 Serve AYAH web page if appropriate. 
 Promoting or demoting a rule based on AYAH page result.           
 
 
Figure 4.6 TDWD data sharing  
With the above discussion, the Figure 4.6 clearly defines the works of each daemon. 
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4.3 Experimental work  
This section illustrates the experimental work based on the novel implementation.  
4.3.1 Test bed architecture 
 
Figure 4.7 Experimental set up  
The simple experimental proof of concepts setup is depicted in Figure 4.7 and used two i7 
desktop computers running Linux Mint 13. Another test bed of 20 attackers and one victim was 
also used and will be described later. The simple set up used only two systems; one serves as the 
victim machine with the detection functionality and other serves as the attacker machine. The 
server on the victim machine was an Apache 2 web server for a sample online shopping website 
  with three web pages including images shown in Figure 4.8. The attacker 
machine generated random DDoS traffic aimed at these web pages. In the victim machine the 
detection analysis is performed by TDWD. The implemented system was stressed with a variety 
of App-DDoS attack loads such as sending similar and random HTTP requests for every 
20ms,7ms and 2ms mixed with manual web accesses. It functioned perfectly allowing human 
requests to pass and blocking attack traffic that fell within the rule detection parameters. 
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Figure 4.8 Aussie touch shopping website 
 
 
Figure 4.9 TDWD observations and results 
4.3.2 Observations and Experimental results 
Figure 4.9 shows the key transactions between the system components and the web pages for 
the activity of evaluating rules (for the 1 in N pages). The user details of a request are sent from 
the Apache server to the daemon via shared memory and the daemon determines if any rules 
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have been broken. The AYAH PHP code running on the web server then checks if the user is 
human or not 
 
Figure 4.10 AYAH web page     
 
Figure 4.11 AYAH operation when rule detects attacker 
 
The detail of AYAH operation is worth explaining as this occasional AYAH page is new and 
novel. The AYAH page shown in Figure 4.10 used to test the effectiveness of a number of 
attacker detection rules implemented in the linked list daemon. The work of AYAH page is 
shown in Figure 4.11.  If the user correctly verifies the AYAH web page then the human count 
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value is incremented, if there is no verification then the non-human (attacker) count is 
incremented and the result is passed into shared memory. The wording of the AYAH page is 
vital and must encourage real humans to participate.   
For example- 
 
The exact wording and trials of this wording is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
An admin control web page can display the aggregated results of rule evaluation from the AYAH 
activity and under manual control mark a rule as active or inactive. 
The admin control web page plays a vital role in the maintenance of the detection rules shown in 
Figure 4.12.  This development version just used counters so we could clearly see the 
relationship between our traffic input and the response of the system.  In a production version, a 
rule rating would be simply calculated as shown in section 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.12 Admin page 
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This thesis developed an admin control web page using PHP code on Apache web server with 5 
columns and 7 rows. This is a scalable structure and the fields can be extended for future 
detection rules. Each field are explained as follows. AYAH web page updates the Human count 
and Non-human count values available in the last two columns. The Linked list daemon rules are 
explained in column 3. The second column is the rule number, the corresponding number of the 
rules implemented in Linked list daemon. The first column is used to disable rule. Admin has the 
full control to disable or degrade the detection rule manually. Consider the rule number 1 in 
Figure 4.12, the human count value is much greater than the non-human count value that shows 
the detection rule performs poorly and punishing legitimate traffic thus that rule should be 
disabled or degraded manually by the admin. The successful rules are then applied to the entire 
traffic flow to block likely attackers. The reset button on the top left corner can be used to clear 
all counters and start a new evaluation cycle.  
This real time scoring of detection rules using AYAH web page increases the effectiveness of 
detection and is far less likely to punish the legitimate traffic. The basic architecture works well 
but for full production use, learning algorithms need to be developed to dynamically enable and 
disable rules. This will be a very interesting area of future research. 
To study the efficacy of this experimental architecture with the shared memory and linked list 
daemon we setup the IDS programs Snort and Bro to simply analyse HTTP traffic but not block 
it. Bro in particular is highly programmable and could be used to create some App-DDoS 
detection facility. Attack traffic of 7000 user requests per second was fired at these IDS systems, 
and the Apache –Linked List implementation. On a 3 GHz PC Snort required 40% of a CPU 
core’s time, Bro 96%, and the TDWD only 3.3%. There is a direct relationship between CPU 
load and real power consumption and so, while not the primary aim of this research, we can 
conclude that the daemon and shared memory architecture is not only effective but will also 
reduce real power consumption. This will be further analysed in a later chapter. 
4.4 Conclusion  
This section has described a novel method for detecting web site attackers based on real time 
calibration of multiple rules using an occasional Are You A Human page. This approach can 
correctly detect flash crowds as legitimate traffic unlike existing methods. The method is feasible 
in terms of memory usage and appears to have lower power consumption than traditional IDS 
software. Testing has confirmed the approach works well on high traffic loads. During testing, it 
was discovered that the new TDWD used far less CPU time and electrical power than the well-
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known IDS programs Snort and Bro. This leads to the next chapter in this thesis which this 
observation is investigated in more detail. 
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5 POWER CONSUMPTION MINIMIZATION 
his research is primarily focussed on adaptive methods for real time scoring to 
differentiate attackers from the legitimate users. The experimental work in the previous 
chapter showed that traditional network software such as Bro and Snort were far less power 
efficient than the newly developed Two-Dimensional Web page Daemon (TDWD). This chapter 
follows up on this important observation and will conclude that there is a novel network 
architecture[93]  that can save significant electrical power and may be applied in many situations. 
In the modern economy, the day to day utility of the Internet is limitless starting from the smart 
phones to the Google cars. Cisco network [2] roughly estimated that by 2018, the total number 
of networked devices connected to the Internet will be twice the global population and the IP 
traffic will reach 2.3ZB by 2020. This huge growth of the Internet combined with the power-
hungry data centres is a great barrier to having a green Internet. Environmentally and 
economically, it is desirable to reduce the power consumption of all network devices. Leading 
Internet companies [97] such as Apple, Facebook, Google and most of the IT sectors are ready 
to opt for an energy efficiency option to reduce their power bill  and to gain financially. 
5.1 Web server farm 
In an enterprise or commercial network, the power consumption of a web server farm [80, 
98] is becoming an increasing issue as both the number of web sites and the traffic increases. 
Many IT industries run multiple data centres with a web server farm handling various collections 
of web servers and security devices. The web server system in a web server, or web server farm, 
consumes power for different reasons including, providing web services for the ingress traffic 
and for a number security functions that may be separate boxes or virtual machines. The power 
usage of web servers is increased when the web servers needed to handle a heavy traffic load or 
may be subject to Denial of Service (DoS) attack or the more difficult to block attacks; the 
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) [99]. Security devices are an essential part of any 
web server system and these devices can consume a significant proportion of the power budget. 
Furthermore, devices that can cope with high traffic loads are very expensive as well as 
consuming considerable power and so it is important to find ways to reduce the computing 
T 
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requirements of these devices by analysing where the power is consumed within the web server 
system.  
The existing methods [22, 81-83, 85, 86, 97, 100-102] which consider power consumption and 
CPU utilisations of security devices are reviewed in section 2.2.2. These all have at least one of 
two flaws that contribute to power consumption-  
There is multiple reception, analysis, and retransmission of Ethernet packets which costs 
computing time and electrical power.  
All the security devices placed at the network ingress point must handle the full load of normal 
and DDoS traffic thus requiring powerful, power hungry and expensive devices. 
5.2 Power analysis of traditional approaches: BRO and SNORT 
The goal of this research is to analyse the power usage of the security software or devices 
within the web server system. Such a comparison is traditional impossible as the software resides 
on a variety of boxes which each box having different internal hardware and CPU types. Even in 
a cloud environment, a software application such as an IDS may be run on different types of 
CPUs and this will confuse any attempt to measure power consumption. The exception here is 
Software Defined Networks (SDN) where security applications can all be run on the one 
hardware platform [103]. This approach is used to achieve the goals of this research, all programs 
can be run on the same hardware and their power consumption compared by measuring CPU 
utilization. 
This research focuses on IDS/IPS systems as they have the most scope to be absorbed into 
other devices. Two well-known and widely used IDS/IPS programs were selected for testing, 
Bro[104]  and Snort[105] . Bro [106] is capable of sophisticated packet analysis and a full IDS 
function. Snort [23, 68, 87, 106, 107]   has some IPS capability but it is essentially an IDS where 
detection based on packet signature matching. This section describes the experimental set up 
used to measure the CPU load used by Bro, Snort, and the author developed TDWD and then 
discusses the result. 
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5.2.1  Test bed 
The two experimental setups depicted in Figure 5.1 & 5.2, both used i7 desktop computers 
running Linux Mint 13. Figure 5.1 illustrates the low traffic test bed that used only two systems; 
one serves as the victim machine with the detection functionality and other serves as the attacker 
machine. Figure 5.2 illustrates the high traffic test bed that used twenty computers, one was the 
victim web server plus the IDS functionality and the others servers acted as the zombie 
machines that attacked the victim. The CPU load measurement is the load on one CPU of a 
multi-core processor and it is independently measured for both the web server and IDS function. 
The server on the victim machine was an Apache 2 web server with three web pages including 
images. The attacker machines generate random DDoS traffic aimed at these web pages. Each 
IDS only sees the incoming web page requests as the outgoing web pages come from the 
system’s server and are assumed safe. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Experimental set up Low Attack Traffic 
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Figure 5.2 Experimental set up High Attack Traffic. 
5.2.2 Implementation 
Bro-IDS version 2.2 and Snort version 2.9 were used in this research. In order to compare the 
CPU utilisation, the scripts written in two ways, to receive the HTTP traffic but do nothing, and 
receive the traffic and apply analysis. In Snort, rules were created and saved in myrules.rules. The 
main concern is to execute only this rule by commenting out all other rules and included only 
myrules.rules in snort.conf file. For Bro, the events are created for module HTTP and saved as 
PREFIX/share/bro/site/myrules.bro. All Bro scripts executed from command terminal using 
./bro –i –eth0 myrules.bro.  Figure 5.3 & 5.4 shows a very simple script using Snort and Bro. 
Both the IDS programs receive traffic without any filters assigned. 
 
Figure 5.3 Bro and Snort programming without HTTP analysis 
This configuration tests the load required just to receive and build up the data packets inside the 
IDS software and excludes the load required to analyse packets. 
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Figure 5.4 Bro and Snort programming with HTTP analysis 
 
The script in Figure 5.4 applies a filtering process on HTTP traffic at the egress point on IDS. 
The HTTP analysis is programmed to apply an over-use page limit rule. This rule triggers if there 
are 10 HTTP requests of selected web pages within 11sec from the attacker machine to the 
victim. Bro scans the abnormal traffic and records results in the notice log. Snort generates an 
alarm file when it detects abnormal network traffic but Snort cannot perform complex rules as 
found in Bro. 
This work also used a complex Bro script to detect an SQL injection attack. A standard Bro 
installation has this script in $PREFIX/share/bro/policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli.bro. 
5.2.3 Experimental Results 
All IDS systems were tested with different attack traffic rates in four different ways to 
compare the CPU load; 
 HTTP attack traffic and the complex rules (Bro only). 
 HTTP attack traffic with HTTP analysis and rules 
 HTTP attack traffic with HTTP no analysis and no rules, and 
 With no load. 
Each test was executed for 10 minutes, which ensured repeatable measurements with timing 
differences less than 0.5% between runs. Comparing Table 5.1 (HTTP reception with analysis 
and rule check) and Table 5.2 (HTTP reception without analysis and no rule check) for the same 
attack traffic rates: 
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Note the column “Attack Traffic #2” in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, the CPU load of Bro 
increases from 19.6% to 21.3% when HTTP analysis is added. Snort has a 0.1% increase 
when HTTP analysis added. 
At “Attack Traffic#3”, Bro shows a 1.6% increase on a base of 22.2% when HTTP 
analysis added. Snort shows no CPU load increase. 
The conclusion from this comparison is that the addition of HTTP analysis adds little to the 
CPU load and that most of the load is taken with no load activities plus a per received packet 
load. Comparing Table 5.1 (HTTP reception and analysis) and 
Table 5.3 (no HTTP traffic) for high traffic level and zero packets/sec shows that the Bro CPU 
load dropped from 99.7% to 13.8% by moving from Table 5.1 to 5.3. For Snort the change was 
41.3% to 0.1%. Surprisingly the result shows that for the IDS software tested, the IDS CPU load 
increased because of the reception of traffic and not because of the processing of the traffic. 
Table 5.4 shows the results for Bro with a complex rule for detecting SQL injection attacks. The 
CPU load (Table 5.4) is only marginally different to the other HTTP rule (Table 5.1) and no rules 
(Table 5.3). Again, the CPU load seems related to packet reception rate and not the HTTP 
analysis. 
Table 5.1  HTTP Reception (analysis and rules) 
 
Table 5.2  HTTP Reception (no analysis and no rules) 
 
Table 5.3  Without HTTP load 
 
Table 5.4  Bro with HTTP and the SQL Injection Rule 
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5.2.4 IDS Load Prediction 
Figure 5.5 & 5.6 graphs the packet rate against the CPU load for Snort and Bro with line of 
best fit. The result is a useably linear relationship between CPU load and packet rate. This means 
it is possible to measure the performance of a system using the low traffic configuration of one 
attacker and one victim as shown in Figure 5.1, then use regression [108-110] to produce the line 
of best fit and hence estimate the CPU load at higher traffic rates. This approach saves time and 
resources as determining CPU load at high traffic rates normally requires a powerful attack 
generator. 
 
Figure 5.5 Bro CPU load with HTTP analysis 
The CPU load is approximately of form given in equation (1) where a and b are constants 
CPU Load % = a + b *html pack/sec (1) 
This results in equation (2) which can be used to predict the CPU load at a given traffic level 
Bro_CPU_load = 0.0137*packets/sec + 15.902 (2)        95% Confidence Interval = 10.19% 
Snort_CPU_load = 0.006*packets/sec + 1.5743 (3)        95% Confidence Interval = 3.91% 
Using equation (2) for the Bro CPU load at the last data point of 6500 HTML packets/sec 
predicts a CPU load of 104.9% which is close to the 99.7% actually measured. Using equation (3) 
for the Snort CPU load at the last data point of 6500 HTML packets/sec predicts a CPU load of 
40.6% which is close to the 41.3% actually measured. 
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 Figure 5.6 Snort CPU load with HTTP analysis 
5.2.5  Observation 
The experimental results show that the main CPU load from Bro and Snort caused by HTTP 
packet reception and not the analysis of that packet. 
5.3 Power Analysis of Two-Dimensional Web page Daemon (TDWD) 
Given the surprising result that most load goes into packet reception it follows that CPU load 
and hence power consumption would be reduced if the IDS function was built into an existing 
program that already performed packet reception to the level of UDP, TCP, or HTTP. This may 
occur at the firewall or at the web server. The primary research in Chapter 4 developed an IDS 
program called Two-Dimensional Web page Daemon (TDWD) which was built into the Apache 
web server [91]. This daemon worked with the HTTP information extracted by the web server 
and so did not require a full Ethernet packet to HTTP conversion as would an IDS such as 
Snort or Bro. In these experiments the daemon then performed a rule based filter much like the 
Bro filter previously described that identified web page requests from the one IP at a rate of 
more than 10 HTTP requests in 11 seconds. 
The measurement and analysis of power usage was done for the IDS daemon in the same way as 
done for Bro and Snort. The results are included in Table 5.5 with Row C. Additionally Apache 
load measured at each traffic level. Row C in Table 5.5 & 5.6 shows TDWD handling all HTTP 
traffic and Snort and Bro given no HTTP traffic. The high traffic load of 6500 packets/second 
will not be analysed as the 99.7% CPU usage for Bro may mean that Bro is losing packets as 
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suggested by the anomalous lower Apache CPU load. Using TDWD to handle HTTP saves Bro 
or Snort considerable CPU load and only marginally increases the CPU load on the web server as 
a result of running the daemon. 
Table 5.5 IDS receiving HTTP traffic with analysis and rules 
 
Table 5.6 IDS receiving no HTTP traffic 
 
Comparing Table 5.5 (for a high traffic level of 4200 packets/sec) and Table 5.6 (zero 
packets/sec) shows that the Bro CPU load dropped from approximately 87% to 14%, for Snort 
the change was 29% to 0.1%. This matches the scenario where all HTTP traffic is handled by 
TDWD. These reductions were bought at the cost of running TDWD which consumes only 
3.3% of CPU load itself and approximately 10% extra CPU in Apache. The overall saving is 
approximately 60% CPU load compared to Bro and 16% compared to Snort. The reason for 
these savings is that the TDWD and Apache combination eliminates the double reception of 
packets and so reduces the overall CPU load on the web server system. Figure 5.7 & 5.8 graphs 
use data in Table 5.5 & 5.6 and show the CPU load of each IDS when receiving HTTP, and the 
resulting load on Apache. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Bro, Snort and TDWD IDS CPU load when receiving HTTP 
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Figure 5.8 Bro, Snort and TDWD Apache CPU load for each IDS 
5.3.1 Comparison of Power usage by BRO, Snort and TDWD 
The existing work described in section 5.1.1 showed that CPU utilisation is linearly related to 
power consumption. We stressed one core of an i7 CPU using the StressLinux [111] program 
and measured the power consumed, the results are depicted in Figure 5.9 with 95% confidence 
interval is 0.6 watt. As per the literature there is a useably linear relationship between CPU load 
on one core and power consumption. Giorgio et al [112] used equation 4 to predict power 
consumption given CPU core utilization. Pmin is the power consumption of the entire CPU 
when the CPU core dedicated to the task of interest has zero utilization. Pmax is the total power 
consumed but the entire CPU when the task of interest is using one core at 100% utilization. 
Power_Consumed = (Pmax-Pmin)*Utilisation + Pmin (4) 
Given the calibration of CPU load to PC power the power consumption of Snort, Bro, and 
TDWD can be graphed. From Figure 5.10 at high traffic rate of 6500 HTML packets/sec, Bro 
consumes 66 watts of the PC’s power whereas Snort consumes 50 watts. The result shows that 
the TDWD can save approximately 25 watts compared to Bro and 10 watts compared to Snort. 
This experiment has shown that an IDS that shares packet reception with another application 
can significantly reduce CPU use and hence power usage. The main CPU load of an IDS 
function is not the analysis function but a per packet load which includes the TCP stack 
converting between the application layer and the physical layer. 
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Figure 5.9 Power consumption vs CPU load 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Power Consumption of Bro, Snort and TDWD 
5.4 Discussion of Alternative Novel Architecture. 
The architecture in Figure 5.11 shows a traditional web server with a proxy server, a firewall, a 
IDS and a webserver where there is packet reception on each box. The same architecture is used 
even with a SDN implementation [103] where these functions might be applications on the one 
host. 
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Figure 5.11 Traditional architecture 
This research has found that the power usage in an IDS is mainly caused by packet reception 
rather than the packet analysis activity. This suggests that at least for SDN it would save CPU 
utilization and power to have one packet reception and to pass complete IP, TCP or UDP 
packets between applications as shown in Figure 5.12. If the IDS was tightly coupled to the web 
server, as in the work in Chapter 4, then the IDS can work with the HTTP information directly 
which further reduces power consumption. 
 
Figure 5.12 Novel architecture 
The objection to this new architecture, for SDN or non-SDN networking, is that security may be 
weaker. If any individual program is penetrated then the other programs or even the operating 
system may be at risk, a problem that could not occur if the functions were in separate boxes. 
The ability of operating systems to provide secure silos for applications is improving. One 
example of such an operating system is Security Enhanced- Linux (SE-Linux) [113, 114]  that 
provides excellent security between applications. Android has some capability in this domain as 
each application is treated as a separate Linux user and so the full force of the standard Linux 
security system is available to stop applications from interfering with each other [115]. The 
adoption of this new architecture is contingent on a secure operating system such as SE- Linux, 
being proved acceptable and having been trialled in a hostile network environment. Apache does 
have the internal architecture to implement the new architecture as shown in Figure 5.12. For 
example, the Apache version 2 filter mod_clamav [116, 117] scans the content delivered by the 
proxy module (mod_proxy) for the viruses on email using the Clamav virus scanning engine. 
ClamAv (Clam Antivirus) is a host based Intrusion Detection system (HIDS) written by Andreas 
Muller and in [116] he mentioned that the processing delay has been reduced when comparing 
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with other antivirus tools. Most likely, as work in this thesis has shown, the removal of another 
packet reception process reduced CPU load. Likewise, any traditional IDS like Bro or Snort 
could be rewritten to run as an Apache web server module and so reduced CPU load. Several 
modules in Apache server such as mod_status, mod_rewrite are useful for implementing server 
security with low CPU overhead. 
5.5  Reflection 
A web server farm may be composed of thousands of web servers and security devices. Security 
devices such as IDS/IPS play a crucial role in safeguarding these web servers but they do 
consume significant CPU time and thus electrical power. Given the large number of web server 
farms in the world, it is important to reduce power consumption for such farms. This research 
has shown a surprising result that the power consumption of the IDS programs Snort and Bro 
(and most likely other security software) in a web server depends mainly the packets received per 
second and depends very little on the analysis performed by these programs. This makes intuitive 
sense as it takes significant CPU time to operate a full TCP/IP stack. Furthermore, the CPU load 
is a useably linear function of packets per second and so CPU load for high traffic rates can be 
estimated from low traffic rate measurements. The results also have implications for the 
architecture of network systems. In a new proposed architecture where programs share a 
common CPU (as may happen with Software Defined Networks) then CPU load (and hence 
electrical power) can be saved if a module receives packets to the level of IP, UDP or TCP, or 
perhaps even HTTP, and then these formed packets are shared between higher level 
applications. The CPU load of packet reception is done once for several applications and not 
repeated for every application.  
Security implications need careful consideration as the infection of one program may result in 
the easy penetration of another program or the operating system on the same CPU. Secure 
operating systems such as SE-Linux hold some hope of providing a secure way to implement to 
new architecture proposed. The work in this research points to several further topics for 
research. The first is to test whether SE-Linux or other operating systems can provide the secure 
software silos needed to run the new architecture. Such a system could be trialled against known 
attacks and then placed in a honey pot arrangement to further stress the system. 
 56 
 
  
 57 
 
6 WEB SERVER SECURITY SYSTEM  
he former research proposed a new methodology (TDWD) for detecting and blocking 
DDoS attacks using web server. The later research critically examined the key impact on 
power consumption when using traditional IDPS systems and concludes that the TDWD 
approach is significantly more power efficient than the traditional IDPS. This power efficient 
implication showed that the IDPS functionality can be absorbed into the web server and so it is 
feasible that the security modules can work at the TCP/UDP/HTTP level leading to significant 
power saving. This proposed a novel architecture discussed in Chapter 5. The system receives 
the packet taken to the TCP/UDP/HTTP level and these formed packets are shared between 
the applications thus the packets need not to travel up and down TCP/IP stack, from Ethernet 
frame to TCP/UDP and from TCP/UDP back down to Ethernet frame. Avoiding multiple 
packet reception and transmission on each devices results in less CPU computing time and 
considerable electrical power saving. Based on this novel foundation, this chapter [94] examines 
the possibility of detecting all types of attacks by distributing the IDPS load between the web 
server and other devices thus stripping out the IDPS box. If this proves feasible, it will reduce 
equipment cost and the electricity usage in a web server farm.    
6.1 Web Server and IDPS 
    The Web plays a vital role in making life more comfortable but some webservers are under 
constant attack. Some of the most common vulnerabilities include such as buffer overflows, 
cross-site scripting, code injection, brute force attacks, and Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A 
web security system is usually built around web proxies, firewalls and Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention systems (IDPS) that all play a significant role in blocking such attacks but they can be 
overwhelmed by high traffic levels and all consume power. In a modest system such as host-
based web server, the network traffic is received, analysed, and transmitted by these security 
devices (web proxies, firewalls, and Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems (IDPS)) before 
getting to the web server. Consider the above scenario, the packet needs to complete the full 
TCP/IP stack three times before the web server. Consider a web server farm in an enterprise 
T 
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that operates many web servers with many of security devices. These security devices consume 
an enormous amount of power due to this repetitive packet reception. 
This section will examine IDPS functionality and discuss the types of attacks such a system can 
detect and block. Some authors [118] have shown that an individual IDPS function can be 
implemented either within a firewall or web server and so there is the possibility of eliminating 
the IDS completely and saving power. 
6.1.1 IDPS Functionality 
      An IDPS aims to detect and alert the system when suspicious traffic occurs and blocks the 
offending traffic [119]. IDPS detection methodologies on major attacks are discussed below. 
IDPS use a range of different methodologies to detect an attack, the most common detection 
methodologies [22, 23, 67-70, 120-122] are signature based detection or pattern matching, 
anomaly based detection and stateful protocol analysis or model based approach.  
 Signature based detection or pattern matching matches the signature of a packet (usually 
within the payload) with the known problems to detect known attack. This detection 
technique is ineffective for unknown threats and zombies. 
 Anomaly based detection alerts the system when there is abnormal traffic but with this 
approach there is a high chance of getting false positive attack detection errors because 
of benign activity that deviates significantly from historical profiles.  
 Stateful protocol analysis or model based approach looks beyond a single packet to look 
at packet sequences and aims to identify problems and attacks.  
Studies shows that the attacks classified based on the actions performed. Common actions [9] 
are probe target device illegally, scanning sequence of devices and find the specific target under 
attack, flood the victim device by accessing repeatedly, use authentication to mimic as legitimate 
user, bypass the firewalls, spoofing (pretending to be a legitimate user), read, copy or steal the 
content of data unethically, modify the originality and delete the target completely. An attacker 
can perform one or more actions as explained above to achieve their needs and their major 
attacks are phishing, cross-site scripting, brute force attacks, cookie poisoning, and DoS attacks 
explained below with IDPS detection techniques. 
Phishing is a common problem in an email, where the embedded hyperlink in a legitimate email 
redirect to the fake website leads to steal the financial secrets. The main aim of this attacker is to 
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have financial gain, identity hiding mainly in the purchase of goods and for fame and notoriety. 
For example, phishing attack is possible through the websites blogs on commercial websites. 
IDPS apply signature-based detection for phishing attacks. The author Khonji et al [123]  
mentioned that the Collaborative Intrusion Detection System (CIDS) where many number of 
IDSs share phishing related data and each IDS will maintain a list of infected IP addresses, 
pattern matches to mitigate phishing attacks. 
Several major websites including eBay, Google, and McAfee have been the targets of cross-site 
scripting, SQL injection exploits, or content based sniffing  [124]. An attacker injects malicious 
script in the web application thereby causing unintended script execution by victim’s browsers. 
Once this attack was successful, they can perform exploits such as account hijacking, cookie 
poisoning, denial of service and web content manipulation. IDPS detection on these attacks are 
based on the signature rules such as pattern matching, whitelist [125] technique which compares 
the inputs with the known good inputs and model-based approach to analyse the user behaviour 
[119].    
Brute force attacks [126] are an illegal attempt to websites by repeatedly trying username and 
password. Major victims are email and banking user. IDPS detect these types of attacks by 
pattern matching [119]. According to a review by Hydara et al [124] this functionality can be 
provided by a web server. 
Cookie poisoning [127]  is a fraudulent act on cookie data after accessing a website. This is a 
common attack on web applications, for example in an online shopping. An attacker can poison 
the cookie by neglecting the shipping fee or postal price using tools as Paros proxy [128]  that 
results in financial loss to the owners. IDPS detect these types of attacks by state transition 
analysis or by model-based approaches. 
Network layer DoS attacks include SYN attack, ICMP attack, and UDP attack [129] that flood 
the request messages to the server and the server remains in a half-opened connection makes 
service unavailable to the legitimate request. For example, in order to establish successful TCP 
connection, the client, and the server should complete handshaking process (SYN, SYN/ACK, 
and ACK) but SYN attackers continuously send the SYN request messages to the server without 
waiting for server response, hence the server remain in the half-opened connection unable to 
provide services for legitimate users. IDPS will detect and block half-opened connections by 
using state transition analysis. 
In common commercial IDPS products such as  Cisco IDS, Snort or Bro commonly detect 
these types of attacks with the help of attack signature matching in central databases like 
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Emerging Threat [9]. IDPS plays a major role in detecting and blocking attacks. Most inline 
IDPS sensors offer firewall capabilities to mitigate the suspicious network activity. A recent 
article [130] mentioned that instead of IDPS, the firewalls could configure to block attacks such 
as Domain Name Service (DNS) and Network Time Protocol (NTP) reflection attacks. 
Nowadays many of the attacks such as cross-site scripting, SQL injection, cookie poisoning are 
detected using webservers.  
6.1.2 Detection techniques by Web server and Firewall.  
There is research that shows web servers can effectively detect individual forms of 
application layer attacks. This subsection examines how web servers and firewalls can take over 
responsibilities of an IDPS. Kim et al [131] patent web server intrusion detection method and 
apparatus for enhancing the security for web attacks. Similar to this approach, WebIDS [132] 
from IBM Tivoli Risk Manager analyses the Web server’s access log files to detect Web server 
attacks. Apache server modules [60] such as mod_security, mod_evasive, and mod_rewrite 
configured to defend against application layer attacks. Mod_security is as web application firewall 
designed for blocking application layer attacks [133, 134]. Mod_evasive [133, 135]  is the best 
Apache module to detect DDoS attacks, where the detection is based on number of single page 
access per unit time. Many researchers show that the web servers are also good at detecting 
application layer attacks. Martin et al [136] stated that server side detection is more powerful for 
cross-site scripting. Anton et al [137] deployed web server to detect the content sniffing attack. 
Their approach based on checking the payload content such as response header, <Meta tag> 
and the number of bytes. Web servers filter the phishing attack [123, 138]  with the help of 
blacklisting and whitelisting IP.  
Web servers are unsuitable for network layer DoS attacks such as SYN, ICMP and UDP flood 
attacks. Haining et al [129] showed that an advanced firewall is capable of resisting these types of 
flooding attacks. Gallagher [130] stated that instead of using an IDPS, firewalls could be 
configured to block network layer attacks and also Domain Name Service (DNS) and Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) reflection attacks and the review [9] shows that the Firewalls filters 
network traffic based on TCP/IP characteristics. 
Elizabeth et al [139] discusses the functionality of commercial web application scanners. This 
survey list out some commercial web application scanners such as AppScan, WebInspect, 
Hailstorm, Acunetix WVS and open source web application scanners, such as Paros and Pantera 
are also popular. These scanners examine the log files from the web server to detect problems. 
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This is essentially an IDS function but not a real time thus making them less useful for directly 
blocking unwanted traffic. 
6.1.3 Rationale 
The literature has outlined the functionality of IDPS and has shown that all individual app-
layer IDPS functions can be moved into the web server, and that individual net-layer IDPS 
functions can be implemented in a firewall. There is no overarching reasoning as to why the 
IDPS is still required. There is no commentary on the possibility or advantages of completely 
eliminating an IDPS. 
6.2 Novel Architecture 
The literature search showed that many authors have implemented individual IDPS functions 
on the firewall or web server. This section will show that the total IDPS function can 
successfully split between a web server and a firewall thus making it possible to eliminate the 
IDPS. Furthermore, it will show that this results in real power and CPU savings even in a cloud 
environment. 
6.2.1  Eliminating IDPS 
 
         Figure 6.1 Attacks handled by Web server and Firewall     
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the attacks handled by IDPS split between the Apache server and the 
Firewall. The Apache web server modules such as mod_status, mod_rewrite, mod_evasive, 
mod_clamav, and mod_proxy are powerful modules that customised using HTTP variables for 
effective detection. The detection techniques used by web server modules are listed in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Attack methods handled by Web server 
 
The Apache web server is capable of detecting all types of attacks except network layer attacks, 
which the Firewall can handle. The first column lists the common types of attacks. The second 
column describes the user activities on each attack. The IDPS detection and blocking methods 
on each one is summarised in the third column. The last column explores the web server 
techniques in handling those attacks. All attacks can be handled by the web server or firewall 
thus it is possible to eliminate the IDPS. In situations requiring very high security the redundancy 
of having an IDPS may be considered worthwhile but there are no attacks which and IDPS can 
handled that cannot be handled by the web server and firewall together.  
Table 6.1 showed that the IDPS functionality can absorbed into the web server and so it is 
feasible that the security modules can work at the TCP/UDP level leading to significant power 
saving. 
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6.3 Practical Implementation 
 
       Figure 6.2 Traditional network design 
          
 
     Figure 6.3 Novel design 
The basic architecture of a traditional IDPS and web server is shown in Figure 6-2 where the 
ingress and egress traffic for each network device is at the level of the Ethernet frame. The IDPS 
used in our work was Snort, and another called Bro. In Chapter 5 section 5.4 showed that this 
was computational inefficient and proposed a generic solution in Figure 5.12. Figure 6.3 shows 
how this was implement as a way to eliminate Bro or Snort when working with Apache. The 
novel architecture shown in Figure 6.3 has been implemented in the Two-Dimensional Web 
page Daemon (TDWD) and uses a two dimensional Linklist (client IP and time) with time based 
garbage collection and further extended. Blacklist blocking is performed simply by looking at the 
user IP. DDoS blocking rules can be evaluated by examining the Linklist of accesses for each 
user IP.   
The following rules have been implemented in TDWD: 
DDoS attack             :  to detect this type of attack there were rules implemented such as similar       
page access per second, accessing pages at random, and repeated same 
page access. 
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Brute Force attack    :  repeated access to the administration page. 
Blocking                   :  Blacklist based on user IP. 
The Two-Dimensional Web Page Daemon (TDWD) is novel and powerful tool as the link list of 
user page request and time allows complex DDoS detection rules to be implemented as well as 
more basic rules such as blacklisting. The research work in Chapter 5 examines the power usage 
of TDWD and compared with the traditional IDS BRO and SNORT. The experimental results 
indicate that BRO and SNORT have a relatively high CPU load compared to TDWD. These 
IDPS programs were configured to receive the network traffic but do no processing. The power 
consumption was proportional to the packets per second. When the analysis was added, the 
power consumption increased very marginally. The receive process which is dominated by 
Ethernet frame to TCP/UDP translation up and down the TCP/IP stack was responsible for 
the majority of the power consumption. To confirm this, the same type of packet analysis was 
programmed into TDWD, which runs inside Apache and inspects the already assembled 
UDP/TCP packets. This added functionality marginally increased the power consumption of 
Apache but this was under 10% of the power used by Snort or Bro to achieve the same 
functionality. 
The experimental work has clearly shown that IDPS functionality can be moved into a web 
server and that further more there is a significant saving in electrical power. This work points to 
a general methodology whereby network devices share data at the highest possible level (HTTP, 
TCP, or UDP) and do not waste CPU time and power in unnecessary conversions between 
Ethernet frames and higher levels. This approach could be useful in a wide variety of network 
designs. 
6.4 Conclusions 
Overall the research determines that the IDPS can have all its functionality moved in to 
firewall or web server thus the IDPS may be removed which saves electrical power. An IDPS 
may be kept for reasons of security redundancy but it is not required as a function. As the IDPS 
functions  are moved into the web server can be implemented at a UDP, TCP, or HTTP level 
thus eliminating the repeated conversions between Ethernet frame and higher levels and an 
effective architecture to load balance between multiple webservers and multiple firewalls. This 
results in a useful saving of CPU capacity and electrical power. A TDWD was developed to hold 
user access requests so they could be analysed for attacks, particularly DDoS attacks. This 
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structure has proved to be very useful and may be the basis for developing novel intelligent 
attack detection and blocking algorithms. Without proper network security even a good 
architecture will fail. In this architecture there is a danger from intruders who have access 
between the IDS/IPS or firewall and the servers. In most enterprise systems this would not be 
possible as the IDS/IPS, firewall and servers would be part of a DMZ. If this is not the case 
then tunnels may be used between devices to ensure security. As explained in section 5.5, an idea 
of implementing SE-Linux  is an effective way to run this as a secured architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
 
  
 67 
 
7 FUTURE WORK 
his chapter explores several research opportunities that have emerged from the analysis 
and architecture outlined in the previous chapters. 
This thesis has developed a novel architecture to block DDoS and IoT DDoS attacks on a web 
server and proved its viability in an experimental implementation. A key novelty was the dynamic 
scoring and usage of detection rules in order to improve the accuracy of detection. Based on this 
implications, an effective  power saving  and web server security architectures are proposed  
Further this thesis extended the creativity as follows  
7.1 Live Usage and Rule Development 
The approach needs to be used on a web site with significant attack traffic and real human 
flash traffic in order to test the implementation architecture and extend and develop the 
detection rule set. This thesis has developed the architecture but developing an optimal rule set 
for real attacks is beyond the scope of this thesis and would be very interesting and practical 
research. 
7.2 Machine Learning 
In Figure 4.2 from Chapter 4, the rules that were active in blocking traffic were manually 
decided, based on the reported rule accuracy. This does not suit a 24/7 web farm where constant 
vigilance would be needed to inspect rule performance and move rules between active and 
inactive. An automated system with machine learning would be much better. There are 
interesting trade-offs between rule parameters, speed of traffic statistic changes, and accuracy 
with different types of traffic. Evaluating the efficacy of various machine learning methods 
would be very interesting research. Another interesting feature is the threshold used for the 
attacker rating which is used to declare a user request to be an attacker. This work used a value 
of 50 but this may not be an optimum value. Again, a learning system may prove better and 
studying various learning methods with different traffic would be very interesting. 
 
T 
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7.3 Two-Dimensional Structure 
The heart of the new detection scheme is a two-dimensional link list that enables the capture 
and storage of packet or request information with face more detail than the simple counters seen 
in equivalent products and software. The time-based garbage collection kept memory 
requirements to a reasonable level. This structure may well be useful to other researchers as they 
seek patterns in network traffic where those patterns must be determined in real time with 
reasonable memory and computing requirements. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
he work in this thesis was based around three research questions that were developed 
after reading the literature. These questions were developed in Chapter 3 and the novel 
work completed in Chapters 4 to 6 allow these questions to be answered. 
 
Answer to Research Question 1: this research [90-92] 
has developed a novel, adaptive, real-time scoring 
algorithm implemented in the Two-Dimensional 
Web page Daemon (TDWD) which provides a 
dynamic and effective attack detection 
mechanism for a web server which was explained 
in Chapter 4.  A very occasional “Are You a 
Human” (AYAH) page is used to calibrate 
detections rules which are then applied to the rest 
of the traffic. The real-time scoring system is 
implemented on an Apache web server and uses 
shared memory to interact with a daemon to 
stop, slow, or allow a user request. The 
algorithms outlined in Chapter 4 are novel and 
stand out as the only algorithms able to 
discriminate legitimate flash traffic from attack 
traffic, or to cope with changing traffic statistics. 
The new approach of using the occasional 
AYAH page allows the real-time calibration of 
attack signatures that is lacking in all other 
methodologies.  
 
 
T 
Research Question 1:  
Current DDoS or IoT DDoS 
detection methods punish both the 
attack traffic as well the legitimate 
and profitable flash traffic.  Is it 
possible to develop novel adaptive 
methods to detect and block DDoS 
and IoT DDoS attack traffic and 
reduce punishment of the legitimate 
traffic? 
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Answer to Research Question 2:  Chapter 5 analyses 
the power consumption of both the security 
software and web server software in a web 
server and concludes that the current approach 
of using a web server plus separate security 
software is not power efficient.  The research in 
this thesis[93]  shows that by moving some 
security software into the web server that there 
is an overall saving in CPU load and power 
consumption. A daemon has been created that 
replicates the function of an IDS from within 
an Apache web server.  The power 
consumption of this daemon is compared to 
that using the existing security software Bro 
and Snort finding that the daemon consumed 
notably less power.  A key finding is that the 
power consumption of traditional IDS systems 
is high due to the multiple receptions of the 
same packet rather than packet analysis. 
 
 Answer to Research Question 3: the research work 
[94] in Chapter 5 has concluded that the web 
server detection of application layer DDoS 
attacks is far more power efficient than an 
equivalent IDPS. Chapter 6 shows that all 
remaining IDPS functionality can be split 
between the firewall and the web server 
allowing the removal of an IDPS and so reduce 
the total power bill of the web farm. Based on 
these findings, the research on Chapter 6 
proposed a novel alternative power efficient 
Research Question 3: 
 Is it possible to eliminate any 
network devices from a web server 
farm and so reduce electrical power 
consumption? 
 
Research Question 2: 
Web server farms use considerable 
electrical power.  For the purpose of 
blocking DDoS attacks at the 
protocol level what can be done to 
reduce power usage? 
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architecture for web servers that may also be usable in other network systems.  
 
Throughout the thesis, novel architectures and algorithms are described and implemented. The 
most notable novelties include- 
 The usage of an occasional AYAH page to calibrate and score rules that attempt to 
differentiate an attacker from a real human. 
 A two-dimensional link list with time based garbage collection to capture details of user 
requests in a memory and CPU efficient manner. This allows more complex rules to be 
applied to a user’s transaction. 
 Identification of how traditional security system waste CPU time and electrical energy in 
the unnecessary unpackaging and repackaging of network packets. This original work 
shows how the electrical power requirements of security software and devices can be 
usefully reduced.  
These innovations are practically useful and the methodologies can be used to protect real web 
servers or web farms. 
The research work in this thesis has also pointed to further research that is both interesting and 
practically useful. The most interesting research relates to how to turn rules on and off in 
response to rule performance as measured when the AYAH page is delivered. This thesis used a 
manual system to enable or disable rules but there is great scope to apply different forms of 
machine learning to automate and optimize this process and to respond quickly to emerging 
threats or profitable flash crowds.  
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